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I
nﬂation was relatively well behaved in the 1990s in comparison with pre-
ceding decades, yet Federal Reserve monetary policy was no less chal-
lenging. The Fed took painful actions in the late 1970s and early 1980s
to reverse rising inﬂation and bring it down, and inﬂation fell from over 10
percent to around 4 percent by the mid-1980s. The worst economic ills stem-
ming from high and unstable inﬂation were put behind us. Yet central bankers
and monetary economists recognized that more disinﬂation was needed to
achieve price stability. The transition to price stability was expected to be
comparatively straightforward. Monetary policy promised to become more
routine. Although the 1990s saw the longest cyclical expansion in U.S. his-
tory, the promised tranquility did not materialize. In many ways the period to
be chronicled here proved to be about as difﬁcult for monetary policy as the
preceding inﬂationary period.
My account of Fed monetary policy divides the period since 1987 into
six distinct phases. This division is natural because in each phase the Fed
was confronted with a different policy problem. Phase 1 begins with rising
inﬂation in the aftermath of the October 1987 stock market crash and ends
with the start of the Gulf War inAugust 1990. Phase 2 covers the 1990–1991
recession, the slow recovery, and the disinﬂation to the end of 1993. Phase
3 tells the story of the Fed’s preemptive tightening against inﬂation in 1994–
1995. Phase 4 deals with the long boom to 1999, the near full credibility
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for low inﬂation, and rising trend productivity growth. Phase 5 addresses the
tighteningofmonetarypolicytoslowthegrowthofaggregatedemandin1999
and 2000. The sixth phase chronicles the collapse of investment in late 2000
and the recession in 2001.
The article presents a relatively compact account of the interaction be-
tween interest rate policy and the economy since 1987. It provides the min-
imum of descriptive detail needed to understand monetary policy during the
period. ThesituationsthatconfrontedtheFedwereremarkablyvaried. Never-
theless, the Fed’s policy actions can be understood and interpreted as support-
ing the primary objectives of monetary policy, which were the same through-
out. First of all, the Fed aimed to achieve and maintain credibility for low
inﬂation. Second, the Fed managed interest rate policy so that the economy
could attain the full beneﬁts of rising trend productivity growth. Third, the
alleviation of ﬁnancial market distress dictated interest rate policy actions on
occasion. Fourth, the Fed steered real short-term interest rates sharply lower
when economic stimulus was needed. The story of how monetary policy
pursued these objectives follows.
1. OCTOBER 1987–JULY 1990: RISING INFLATIONAND THE
STOCK MARKET CRASH
From Wednesday, 14 October 1987, through the close of trading on Monday,
19 October, the Dow Jones Industrial Average lost about 30 percent of its
value. On Monday alone, the Dow lost 23 percent. Not since October 1929,
when the Dow lost around 25 percent in two consecutive days, had a sudden
collapse of equity values been so great.1
The Fed responded to the October 1987 stock market crash in a number
of ways. For our purposes, its most important responses were these. The Fed
accommodated the increased demand for currency and bank reserves with
extensive open market purchases. It also dropped its federal funds rate target
from around 7.5 percent to about 6.75 percent.
Central bankers now know that sufﬁciently stimulative monetary policy
might well have averted the deﬂation and depression of the 1930s. The Fed
made sure that monetary policy was sufﬁciently stimulative to avert another
catastrophe. TheFedwasconcernedabouttheresultingriskstopricestability,
noting that its actions should not be seen as inﬂationary.2
As it turned out, inﬂation rose in 1988, 1989, and 1990 in spite of the fact
thattheFedhadputtheeconomythroughasevererecessionintheearly1980s
to restore price stability. Core CPI inﬂation rose from around 3.8 percent in
1986 to 5.3 percent in 1990. Employment cost inﬂation rose from around
1 This paragraph is heavily paraphrased from the Brady Report (1988, 1).
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3 percent in 1986 to over 5 percent in 1989, even as productivity growth
averaged less than 1 percent from 1986 to 1990. The unemployment rate
fell from around 7 percent in 1986 to 5.3 percent in 1989. Annual average
unemployment below 5.5 percent had not been seen since 1973.
Part of the problem was that inﬂationary pressures began to build well
before October 1987. Rising inﬂation expectations were already evident in
the 30-year bond rate, which rose by 2 full percentage points from around 7.5
percentto9.6percentbetweenMarchandOctoberof1987.3 Surprisingly, the
Fed reacted relatively little to the 1987 inﬂation scare. The Fed’s failure to
respond created doubts that it would hold the line on inﬂation, much less push
on to price stability. The bond rate did not fall back to the 7.5 percent range
until late 1992, reﬂecting the slow restoration of credibility for low inﬂation
that was lost in the second half of the 1980s.
In short, by mid-1987 there was sufﬁcient reason for the Fed to tighten
policy preemptively against inﬂation. And the Fed raised the discount rate
from5.5percentto6percentinSeptembersoonafterAlanGreenspanreplaced
PaulVolckerasFedChairman.4 ButtheOctoberstockmarketcrashintervened
before policy could be tightened further.
All in all, it seems fair to say that monetary policy restraint was delayed
by a couple of years because the Fed was reluctant to act against inﬂation both
beforeandafterthecrashofOctober1987. BythetimetheFedfeltitwassafe
to tighten monetary policy further, it needed to counteract inﬂationary forces
that were already well entrenched. As had been the case in the inﬂationary
go/stop era, the restoration of credibility for low inﬂation after it was compro-
mised required the Fed to raise real short rates higher than otherwise, with a
greater risk of recession.
Beginninginthespringof1988, theFedbegantoraisethefundsratefrom
the 6 to 7 percent range to nearly 10 percent in March 1989. With core CPI
inﬂation then running at about 4.5 percent, that sequence of policy actions
increased real short rates by over 3 percentage points to more than 5 percent.
Real GDP growth slowed from about 4 percent in 1988 to 2.5 percent in 1989.
In response the Fed dropped the funds rate to around 7 percent by late 1990.
However, by then core CPI inﬂation was running at 5.3 percent, well above
its mid-1980s average.
3 Ireland (1996) shows quantitatively why a signiﬁcant change in the long bond rate is likely
to represent a change in inﬂation expectations rather than a change in the expected real rate.
Goodfriend (1993) gives an account of inﬂation scares in the bond market during the 1980s.
4 The 1987 inﬂation scare may have reﬂected doubts about the credibility of Volcker’s un-
known successor.4 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
2. AUGUST 1990–JANUARY 1994: WAR, RECESSION,AND
DISINFLATION
TheAugust 1990 GulfWar dealt a severe blow to the U.S. economy. It would
takeuntilMarch1991forU.S.groundforcestoejectIraqitroopsfromKuwait
and stabilize the region. The ground war went as well as could have been
expected, lasting only 100 hours. But the outcome appeared to be in doubt
until a few hours before the war was won. Consequently, uncertainty greatly
affected the economy for nearly eight months. In August 1990 oil prices
quickly spiked up from about $15 per barrel to over $35, falling back only
gradually by early 1991. Households and businesses showed an inclination to
postpone spending until the outcome of the war became clear. These supply
and demand shocks caused economic activity to contract in the fall of 1990
through the ﬁrst quarter of 1991. The National Bureau of Economic Research
dates the 1990 recession from July 1990 to the trough in March 1991.
Monetary policy could do little to avert a recession during the Gulf War.
Policy actions take time to act on the economy. Moreover, the war occurred
at a time when the Fed’s credibility for low inﬂation had been compromised.
As mentioned above, core CPI inﬂation rose from 3.8 percent in 1986 to 5.3
percent in 1990. And the Fed risked an inﬂation scare in the bond market if
it cut the federal funds rate too sharply. Even so, the Fed brought the federal
funds rate down from just above 8 percent at the start of the Gulf War to just
under 6 percent at its close in the spring of 1991.
As a result of the restrictive policy actions undertaken by the Fed prior to
the Gulf War and the war-related recession itself, inﬂation began to recede.
Core CPI inﬂation decreased to 4.4 percent in 1991. The recovery from the
recession trough in March 1991 proved to be slow in part because the reces-
sion itself was mild. The unemployment rate rose only a little more than 1
percentage point during the recession itself, from 5.5 percent in July 1990 to
6.8 percent in March 1991. Even though real GDP growth snapped back to
4 percent in 1992 from 0.8 percent growth in 1991, the unemployment rate
continued to climb, peaking at 7.8 percent in June 1992. This was known as
the “jobless recovery.”
The Fed reacted by steadily reducing the federal funds rate from 6 percent
in mid-1991, to 4 percent by the end of 1991, to 3 percent by October 1992,
where it stayed until February 1994. Inﬂation fell as well, to around 3 percent
by 1992. The nominal federal funds rate cut partly reﬂected the 1 1/2 percent-
age point fall in inﬂation and partly represented a 1 1/2 percentage point cut
in the real federal funds rate, bringing the real rate to approximately zero.
Four factors account for the highly stimulative policy stance. First, the
highandrisingunemploymentratewasaconcern. Second,thebankingsystem
wasundercapitalizedinmanyareasofthecountry. Bankloanswereexpensive
and somewhat more restricted than usual. Third, inﬂation had been brought
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about 1 percentage point below where it had been in the mid-1980s. Fourth,
the gains against inﬂation restored the Fed’s credibility enough that it could
comfortablyriskmovingtoazerorealfederalfundsratetostimulateaggregate
demand and job growth.
The zero real short rate remained in place for about 18 months, until
February 1994. During that time the unemployment rate fell from 7.8 percent
to 6.6 percent. The inﬂation rate fell slightly. The long bond rate fell from
around 7.5 percent in October 1992 to around 6 percent at the end of 1993.
The lower bond rate may have been the result of a weak economic expansion
and progress against the Federal budget deﬁcit made at the time. The bond
rate also probably reﬂected the acquisition of credibility for low inﬂation won
bytheFedasaconsequenceofdisinﬂationarypolicyactionstakensince1988.
3. FEBRUARY 1994–FEBRUARY 1995: PREEMPTING RISING
INFLATION
The economic expansion gathered strength in late 1993. The zero real federal
fundsratewasnolongerneededandwouldbecomeinﬂationaryifleftinplace.
The Fed began to raise the federal funds rate in February 1994, taking it in
seven steps from 3 percent to 6 percent by February 1995. Inﬂation showed
little tendency to accelerate and remained between 2.5 percent and 3 percent.
Thus, the Fed’s policy actions took the real federal funds rate from zero to a
little more than 3 percent. The move raised real short-term interest rates to
a range that could be considered neutral to mildly restrictive. In spite of the
policy tightening, real GDP grew by 4 percent in 1994, up from 2.6 percent
in 1993, and the unemployment rate fell from 6.6 percent to 5.6 percent from
January to December 1994.
The policy tightening in 1994 succeeded in its main purpose: to hold
the line on inﬂation without creating unemployment. The unemployment rate
moveduponlyslightlyto5.8percentinApril1995andthenbegantofallagain.
The 1994 tightening demonstrated that a well-timed preemptive increase in
realshort-terminterestratesisnothingtobefeared. Inthiscase, itwasneeded
to slow the growth of aggregate demand relative to aggregate supply to avert
a build up of inﬂationary pressures. By holding the line on inﬂation in 1994,
preemptive policy actions laid the foundation for the boom that followed.
Preemptive policy in 1994 was motivated in part by the large increase in
the bond rate beginning in October 1993. Starting from a low of 5.9 percent,
the 30-year bond rate rose through 1994 to peak at 8.2 percent just before
election day in November. The nearly 2 1/2 percentage point increase in the
bond rate indicated that the Fed’s credibility for low inﬂation was far from6 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
secure in 1994. By January 1996 the bond rate had returned to around 6
percent and journalists were talking about the “death of inﬂation.”5
Talk of the death of inﬂation was reassuring. It indicated that the Fed’s
preemptive actions had anchored inﬂation and inﬂation expectations more se-
curely than ever before. This helps to explain why later in the decade the
unemployment rate could fall to 4 percent with little inﬂationary wage and
price pressure. However, the death-of-inﬂation talk was also disappointing
because it tended to undervalue the role played by the Fed in “killing” in-
ﬂation. The actions taken in 1994 were a textbook example of a successful
preemptive campaign against inﬂation. It is discouraging that even then, the
public should misunderstand the crucial role played by the central bank in
containing inﬂation. If inﬂation is to be contained permanently, the idea that
inﬂation doesn’t just “die” but must be periodically vanquished by proactive
interest rate policy is one that the public must appreciate more fully.
The preemptive tightening in 1994 was difﬁcult for the Fed even though it
was clearly needed. Beginning with the 25 basis point increase in the federal
funds rate in February 1994, the Fed started to announce its current intended
federal funds rate target immediately after each FOMC meeting. This new
practice made Fed policy more visible than ever. Every increase in the federal
funds rate target since then has attracted considerable attention.
Transparency of the Fed’s interest rate target is a good thing because it
improvesthepublic’sunderstandingofmonetarypolicy. However,since1994
the Fed has operated with a transparent federal funds rate target and some-
what opaque medium- and longer-term goals.6 The Federal ReserveAct does
not specify how the Fed is to balance medium- or longer-term objectives for
inﬂation, economic growth, and employment. And the Fed does not clarify
its medium- or long-term objectives as well as it could. Its interest rate pol-
icy actions are scrutinized more than they would be if the Fed were more
forthcoming about its objectives.
Part of the problem is that the Fed is naturally unwilling to specify its
objectives more clearly without direction from Congress. And Congress has
beenunabletoagreeonamandatefortheFedthatwouldresultinclariﬁcation.
The Fed has been operating without a clear mandate from Congress since the
collapseofthegoldstandardandtheBrettonWoodsﬁxedexchangeratesystem
in 1973. Under these circumstances, announcing the federal funds rate target
increases the potential for counterproductive disputes between Congress and
the Fed.
One such dispute broke into the open in 1994 when Congress objected
to the Fed’s preemptive increase in interest rates and took the unprecedented
step of inviting all 12 Reserve Bank presidents to explain their views before
5 See, for instance, Bootle (1996).
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the House and Senate banking committees. Legislation that would remove
the presidents from the FOMC was considered at the time on the grounds
that the presidents were thought to favor excessively tight monetary policy.
The net effect of this very public dispute was to create doubt about the Fed’s
ability and willingness to take the tightening actions necessary to hold the
line on inﬂation. The public dispute between the Fed and Congress probably
contributed to the severity of the 1994 inﬂation scare in the bond market.
4. JANUARY 1996–MAY 1999: THE LONG BOOM
In many ways managing interest rate policy was more difﬁcult in the last half
of the 1990s than in the ﬁrst half. Two major factors complicated interest rate
policy in the period from 1996 to 1999. First, the Fed had to learn to operate




had long hoped that advances in computer and information technology would
bring an end to the productivity slowdown dating from the mid-1970s. Nev-
ertheless, both developments challenged monetary policy in ways that were
not anticipated. This section reviews the developments themselves and points
out their complications for monetary policy. It concludes with an assessment
of interest rate policy actions taken by the Fed during the period.
Near Full Credibility for Low Inﬂation
Whennearfullcredibilityforlowinﬂationisnewlywon,boththecentralbank
and the public tend to overestimate the economy’s noninﬂationary potential
output. In other words, both are inclined to be fooled by the central bank’s
credibility for low inﬂation in a way that restrains interest rate policy actions
that may be necessary to sustain that very credibility. Even if inﬂation and
inﬂation expectations remain ﬁrmly anchored, there is a risk that interest rate
policy actions will be insufﬁcient to head off an unsustainable real boom
followed by a painful period of adjustment.7 The nature of this risk is detailed
below with reference to the long boom from 1996 to 1999.
When credibility for low inﬂation is secure, labor markets can get surpris-
ingly tight without triggering inﬂationary wage pressures. Workers are less
inclined to demand inﬂationary nominal wage increases because they have
conﬁdence that ﬁrms will not push product prices up. And ﬁrms are more
inclined to hold the line on product price increases even if labor costs begin to
7 Goodfriend (2001) and Taylor (2000) explore this sort of logic.8 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
rise. Firms and workers have conﬁdence that any excess of aggregate demand
over potential output will be temporary, reversed by sufﬁciently restrictive
subsequent interest rate policy actions. Conﬁdence in the central bank can
enable the economy to operate above potential output for a while with little
or no increase in inﬂation.
With inﬂation and inﬂation expectations ﬁrmly anchored, a central bank
will be more inclined to delay monetary tightening when the economy moves
above its presumed noninﬂationary potential level of output. It could take
more time to discern whether an excess of aggregate demand is temporary
or persistent before it responds with tighter monetary policy. When there is
evidence of a rising trend in productivity growth, a central bank could explore
thepossibilitythatfastergrowthofaggregatedemandmightbeaccommodated
without inﬂation.
The Fed’s very success in anchoring inﬂation and inﬂation expectations
meant that traditional indicators of excessive monetary stimulus became less
reliable.8 Inﬂation as measured by the core CPI ranged between 2 percent
and 3 percent for the remainder of the decade. Price stability was maintained
even though real GDP grew at around 4.4 percent per year from 1996 through
1999, and the unemployment rate fell from 5.6 percent in January 1996 to 4
percent, a rate not seen since 1970.
Clearly, near full credibility for low inﬂation helped the economy to oper-
ate well beyond a level that would have created concerns about inﬂation in the
past. Real indicators of incipient inﬂation such as the unemployment rate be-
came less useful as guides for interest rate policy. Moreover, the bond market
was less inclined to exhibit inﬂation scares. After having peaked at 8.2 per-
cent in late 1994, the 30-year bond rate returned to levels below 7 percent and
moved in a range between 5 percent and 6 percent in the last two years of the
decade. This development recalled the bond market of the late 1960s, which
was conﬁdent that inﬂation would remain low even after economic activity
moved above what was then considered its noninﬂationary potential.
Nominal money growth also became less reliable as an indicator of inﬂa-
tion. Growth temporarily in excess of historical standards might be needed
to accommodate an increased demand for money due to lower nominal in-
terest rates and growing conﬁdence in the stability of the purchasing power
of money. Even truly excessive money growth might not cause inﬂation if
the public believed that the Fed would tighten policy to reverse inﬂationary
money creation before too long.9
If the public comes to think that the economy has become “structurally”
lesspronetoinﬂation,i.e.,that“inﬂationisdead,”thentheriskofanunsustain-
able boom increases still further. Excessive optimism encourages households
8 These informational problems add to the real-time data problems analyzed in Orphanides
(2001).
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and ﬁrms to expect unrealistically high future real income prospects, trigger-
ing an unsustainable spending binge. Spending is encouraged further if the
central bank appears to buy into the optimism by not raising interest rates
as aggregate demand accelerates. Excessively optimistic expectations for the
economy’sproductivepotentialwouldbereﬂectedinarun-upinequityprices,
real estate values, and asset prices in general. The risk of precipitating a col-
lapse of asset prices would in turn make a central bank more cautious than
otherwise in tightening interest rate policy.
Rising Productivity Growth
From 1986Q1 until 1990Q4 nonfarm business productivity growth averaged
only 0.8 percent per year, reﬂecting the ongoing slowdown in productivity
growththatbeganinthemid-1970s. Inthenextﬁveyearsproductivitygrowth
rose to 1.7 percent per year, and from 1996Q1 to 2000Q4 productivity grew
onaverageby2.4percentperyear. Inotherwords,productivitygrowthtripled
over this 15-year period. In the late 1990s it was possible to argue that the
burstofproductivitygrowthwasonlytemporaryandwouldsoonfallbackto2
percent or less. But it was just as reasonable to argue that productivity growth
would move even higher for a while as the economy continued to ﬁnd new
ways to employ advances in communications and information technology.
The trend productivity growth rate has enormous implications for stan-
dardsofliving,forperceivedlifetimeincomeprospects,andforcurrentspend-
ing. When productivity grows at 1 percent a year, national per capita product
doubles roughly every 70 years. If productivity grows at 2 percent per year,
then per capita product doubles in 35 years and quadruples every 70 years.
Sustained3percentproductivitygrowthwoulddoublepercapitaincomein23
years, quadrupleitin46years, andresultinaneightfoldincreaseinaround70
years. This last possibility seems unlikely; but sustained productivity growth
between 2 percent and 2.5 percent per year well into the 21st century would
match the 2.3 percent average productivity growth rate that the United States
sustained between 1890 and 1970.10 These ﬁgures indicate the tremendous
long-term potential that many saw in the U.S. economy in the last half of the
1990s—and still see in spite of the 2001 recession.
Real wages began to rise during the 1990s after stagnating during the pro-
ductivity slowdown period. Households could count on the fact that through-
out U.S. history, per capita productivity growth was transmitted to real wage
growth as ﬁrms competed for ever more productive labor. Firm proﬁts and
equity values would beneﬁt initially from the installation of more productive
technology. But as the installation of that technology became widespread,
10 See Romer (1989, 56).10 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
ﬁrms would be forced to pay up for the more productive labor. Thus, the
proﬁt share of national income rose during the 1990s, but it could be expected
to return to historic norms once real wages caught up. Whether the increase
in income took the form of rising proﬁts or wages, its underlying source was
the rising trend in productivity growth.
In short, the period from 1996 to 1999 was characterized by an optimism
about future income prospects. This optimism gave rise to an expansion
in investment and productive capacity by ﬁrms matched by an increasing
willingness of households to absorb the output that the growth of productive
potential made possible.
Rising productivity growth had two critical implications for monetary
policy. First, rising productivity growth reinforced the perception that the
economy was inﬂation-proof and provided an argument against more restric-
tive monetary policy. For a while, rising productivity growth more than offset
therisingnominalwagegrowthassociatedwithtightlabormarkets. Theprob-
lem for monetary policy was that trend productivity growth was not likely to
rise much above 2.5 percent or 3 percent per year. And productivity was
already growing in that range by 1998. There was less reason to think that
nominal wage growth would stop rising if labor markets remained as tight as
they became during the period. Rising productivity growth might hold unit
labor costs and inﬂation down for a while, but at some point unit labor costs
would begin to rise, necessitating tighter monetary policy.
Second, although rising productivity growth made the economy more
inﬂation-proofintheshortrun,higher trendproductivitygrowthwouldrequire





from the future into the present because the future productivity growth has
not yet arrived.11 In such circumstances, ﬁrms accommodate the growth in
aggregate demand in excess of current productivity growth by hiring more
labor to meet the demand.12 Labor markets become increasingly tight, and
the economy overshoots even its faster sustainable growth path.
To enable the economy to grow faster without inﬂation, the central bank
would have to maintain higher short-term real rates on average over time to
make households and ﬁrms sufﬁciently patient to defer their spending to the
future. Higher short- and long-term real rates bring aggregate demand down
11 In part, the United States satisﬁed its demand for goods and services in excess of current
output by importing capital from abroad (where growth prospects were not as bright) and running
a current account deﬁcit.
12 See Goodfriend and King (1997) for a discussion of the macromodel underlying the anal-
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to potential output so that both can grow together and the employment rate
is neither expanding nor contracting over time. In short, when an economy
enjoys an increase in the rate at which productivity can grow over the long
run, it requires permanently higher real interest rates on average to offset the
inclination of the public to spend the proceeds prematurely.13
The problem for U.S. monetary policy during the period from 1996 to
1999 was to ascertain the timing and magnitude of the increase in real interest
rates necessary to allow the economy to transition to a higher growth path
without creating imbalances in labor utilization that could lead to an outbreak
ofinﬂationoranunsustainableexpansionofrealactivity. Thispolicyproblem
was particularly formidable because it had to be solved even as near full
credibility for low inﬂation and rising productivity growth made the economy
appear to be more inﬂation-proof than ever.
Interest Rate Policy 1996–1999
The Fed changed its federal funds rate target relatively little from January
1996 through June 1999. The funds rate was held at 5.25 percent for over a
year from January 1996 until March 1997, when it was raised to 5.5 percent.
The funds rate was then held constant for another 18 months at 5.5 percent
until the fall of 1998, when it was cut by 75 basis points in three 25 basis point
steps in September, October, and November in the aftermath of the Russian
debt default. Core CPI inﬂation averaged between 2 percent and 2.5 percent
during the entire period, so the real short rate was around 3 percent, except
when it was lowered by 75 basis points in the fall of 1998.
The single 25 basis point adjustment in March 1997 was made as the
economic expansion gathered momentum. By moving in March 1997, the
Fed signaled that it was poised to act if necessary to restrain inﬂationary
growth. However, the Fed declined to raise interest rates further for two years
becausetwoworldﬁnancialcrisesintervened: the1997ﬁnancialcrisisinEast
Asia and the 1998 ﬁnancial crisis following the Russian default. Alleviating
ﬁnancial market distress became a primary focus of monetary policy in each
case.
The Fed did not actually cut its funds rate target in the second half of
1997 in response to the East Asian crisis, but it probably deferred tightening
policy. The 75 basis point cut in the funds rate following the Russian default
movedshort-terminterestratesintheoppositedirectionfromthatwhichwould
ultimately be needed to stabilize the U.S. economy. As was the case in the
aftermath of the October 1987 stock market crash, the two ﬁnancial crises in
13 For log utility, the real interest rate must rise by the increase in the productivity growth
rate.12 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
1997 and 1998 helped to delay a necessary policy tightening by as much as
two years.
However, my reading of the forces acting on monetary policy during
the boom—near full credibility and rising productivity growth—suggests that
even without the two ﬁnancial crises, the Federal Reserve would have been
reluctant to tighten monetary policy very much between 1996 and 1999. Not
only was inﬂation under control, but there was great uncertainty about the
magnitude and timing of the interest rate policy actions needed to enable the
economy to transition to a higher growth path without inﬂation. Under the
circumstances, the Fed chose to wait before tightening very much until the
need for restrictive policy became more obvious.14
5. JUNE 1999–DECEMBER 2000: RESTRAINING THE
GROWTH OF DEMAND
By the second half of 1999, the pool of available workers—unemployed plus
discouraged workers—looked to be approaching an irreducible minimum,
and the growth of aggregate demand in excess of plausible potential GDP
tightened labor markets further. If real interest rates were kept too low, then
theexpansionwouldendinoneoftwoways. TheFedcouldloseitscredibility
for low inﬂation and the expansion would end as it had so often in previous
decades, with rising inﬂation, an inﬂation scare in bond markets, and a policy
tighteningsufﬁcienttorestorecredibilityforlowinﬂation. Alternatively,ifthe
Fed’snearfullcredibilityforlowinﬂationheldfast,thenrisingunitlaborcosts
would result in a proﬁt squeeze, lower equity values, a collapse in investment,
and slower growth of consumer spending.
RealGDPgrewbyaspectacular4.7percentand8.3percentinQ3andQ4
of 1999, and the unemployment rate drifted down from 4.3 percent in early
1999to4percentbytheendoftheyear. Theextraordinarygrowthofaggregate
demand outstripped even the high accompanying productivity growth rates of
3 percent and 7.4 percent, respectively.
Clearly, real short rates needed to move up further. The Fed reversed
the 75 basis point easing of policy it had undertaken the previous autumn
with three 25 basis point steps in June, August, and November of 1999. It
also raised its federal funds rate target by another percentage point between
November 1999 and May 2000 to 6.5 percent, where it was held until January
2001.
With core CPI inﬂation running at about 2.5 percent, real short rates were
roughly4percent. Bycomparisonwithotheroccasionsofconcertedmonetary
14A new literature considers whether asset prices should help guide interest rate policy. See
Bernanke and Gertler (2000), Borio and Lowe (2001), Cecchetti et al. (2000), Goodfriend (2002),
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tightening, the real interest rate was not then particularly high. In part, this
was due to the fact that the Fed had not yet lost credibility for low inﬂation
and so did not need higher real rates to bring inﬂation down. The 4 percent
real rate seemed to be enough as real GDP growth in 2000Q1 slowed from
the previous quarter by 6 percentage points, to 2.3 percent. However, real
growth accelerated again to 5.7 percent in 2000Q2 and the Fed stayed with
its 6.5 percent funds rate target. Real GDP growth in Q3 again slowed, to 1.3
percent, but the Fed needed another quarter of evidence that the slowdown
would be sustained. That conﬁrmation was received in late 2000 and early
2001,whenitbecameclearthatrealGDPgrewbyaround2percentin2000Q4.
6. JANUARY 2001–PRESENT: THE COLLAPSE OF
INVESTMENTAND THE 2001 RECESSION
The problem for monetary policy in 2001 was that real GDP growth failed to
ﬁnd a bottom and continued to fall, from 1.3 percent in Q1, to 0.3 percent in
Q2, to −1.3 percent in Q3. Personal consumption expenditure growth held up
better, slowingfrom3percent, to2.5percent, andto1percent, respectively, in
theﬁrstthreequartersof2001. Inpart,consumerspendingheldupreasonably
well because the unemployment rate rose relatively slowly from a very low
4 percent at the end of 2000 to 4.6 percent by July 2001. The comparatively
tight labor market continued to provide a sense of job security and robust real
wage growth that supported consumer conﬁdence.
The primary drag on growth in 2001 came from nonresidential ﬁxed in-
vestment and inventory liquidation. Investment in equipment and software
grew much faster than GDP during the boom years. Advances in information
processing and communication technologies led investment in equipment and
software to rise from about 6 percent of real GDP in 1990 to a peak of around
12 percent of real GDP in mid-2000. Real nonresidential (business) ﬁxed in-
vestment, which includes nonresidential structures as well as equipment and
software, grewataround10percentperyearfrom1995until2000. Growthin
business investment collapsed to near zero in 2000Q4 and 2001Q1 and then
contracted at more than a 10 percent annual rate in Q2 and Q3 of 2001.
The swing in inventory accumulation compounded the growth slowdown
in 2001. After accumulating at an annual rate of $79 billion, $52 billion, and
$43 billion dollars in Q2, Q3, and Q4 of 2000, inventories were liquidated
at an annual rate of $27 billion, $38 billion, and $62 billion in the ﬁrst three
quarters of 2001, respectively.15
The developments outlined above reﬂect the fact that the economy over-
shot its sustainable growth rate in the late 1990s. Much capacity put in place
15 GDP is around $10 trillion, so $100 billion is about 1 percent of U.S. GDP.14 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
during the boom began to look excessive once the growth rate slowed. Higher
trendproductivitygrowthwouldeventuallyenabletheeconomytoabsorbthat
capacity, but not as soon as had been believed. Moreover, rising unemploy-
ment in the manufacturing sector caused a secondary collapse of demand that
threatened to spill over to the services sector. The rising unemployment rate
caused consumers throughout the economy to become more cautious, weak-
ening aggregate demand further. This, in turn, gave businesses an additional
reason to put investment plans on hold.
Financial factors signiﬁcantly ampliﬁed the overshooting in investment
and the painful adjustment thereafter. Excessive equity values cheapened
equity ﬁnance during the boom years, and the collapse of equity values raised
the cost of equity ﬁnance during the slowdown. Likewise, high net worth
facilitated external debt ﬁnance during the boom, and the loss of net worth
raisedthecostofexternaldebtﬁnancethereafter. Moreover, investmentcould
be ﬁnanced readily with internally generated funds during the boom, but the
decline of proﬁts during the slowdown caused ﬁrms to become more reliant
on external ﬁnance even as it became more costly.
Recognizing the contractionary forces described above, the Fed cut its
federal funds rate target in 11 steps from 6.5 percent at the beginning of 2001
to 1.75 percent in December 2001. Core CPI inﬂation did not change much
during the year, so the policy actions translated into a 4 3/4 percentage point
cut in real short-term interest rates. This was a relatively large reduction in
the real federal funds rate in so short a time by historical standards, though
not when one considers that real GDP grew at around 5.25 percent in the year
through2000Q2andgrewatlessthan1percentin2001. Realshortrateswere
then negative according to the core CPI inﬂation rate, which was running at
about 2.5 percent. The Fed was able to cut the real federal funds rate so far
without precipitating an inﬂation scare because of the near full credibility for
low inﬂation.
The 11 September 2001 destruction of the World Trade Center in New
York made matters worse. Data for October indicated a sharp drop in con-
sumerconﬁdence, andafurthercontractioninthemanufacturingsector. Most
striking, roughly 800,000 jobs were lost in October and November combined.
The rise in the unemployment rate in September, October, and November was
thefastestthree-monthincreasesince1982, bringingthecumulativerisesince
January to about 1 3/4 percentage points. In November 2001 the National Bu-
reau of Economic Research ofﬁcially declared that the United States had been
in a recession since March.
Thebigjumpintheunemploymentratehadthepotentialtounderminecon-
sumer conﬁdence. The unemployment rate in the United States rose sharply
by at least 2 percentage points on ﬁve occasions since 1960: during and fol-
lowing the recessions of 1960–1961, 1969–1970, 1973–1975, 1981–1982,
and 1990–1991. The cumulative rise during the 1980 recession was just 1.5M. Goodfriend: Phases of U.S. Monetary Policy 15
percentage points.16 The unemployment rate rose by 4.2 percentage points in
1973–1975, and by 3.6 percentage points in 1981–1982.
Thebigjumpinunemploymentcarriedasecondrisk: historically,sharply
rising unemployment has been associated with falling inﬂation. For instance,
when the unemployment rate rose by 3.6 percentage points in 1981–1982, the
inﬂation rate fell by around 6 percentage points. Disinﬂation was beneﬁcial
when inﬂation was too high. When inﬂation was too high, the Fed had the
leewaytocutitsnominalfederalfundsratetargettokeeptherealfederalfunds
rate from rising as the disinﬂation ran its course. In 2001, the Fed had only 1
3/4 percentage points of leeway before the nominal federal funds rate would
hit the zero bound.
That said, there were three reasons to think that disinﬂation would be
relatively mild this time. First, the unemployment rate might not rise much
more since the Fed had already cut the real funds rate by 4 3/4 percentage
points. Second, slower wage growth due to slack in the labor market might
be matched by slower productivity growth. If that were the case, then unit
labor costs would not fall much and there would be little downward pressure
on prices. Third, the earlier recessions were set off in large part by tighter
monetary policy aimed at reducing inﬂation. This time the Fed was not trying
to bring the inﬂation rate down.
No one can say how the latest situation confronting U.S. monetary policy
will turn out. The zero bound may yet become a problem. Hopefully, aggres-
sive interest rate actions undertaken in 2001 have laid the foundation for a full
recovery in 2002. In that regard, it is worth noting that the federal funds rate
futures market believed at the end of 2001 that the funds rate had hit bottom
and that the Fed would raise interest rates as the economy recovered in 2002.
7. CONCLUSION
The challenges facing monetary policy since 1987 have been surprisingly var-
ied. Rising inﬂation was a problem for the Fed only brieﬂy during the period.
Restrictive monetary policy in the late 1980s and early 1990s reversed the
rising inﬂation trend, and preemptive policy actions in 1994 secured near full
credibility for low inﬂation in the late 1990s. The Fed dealt with three major
ﬁnancial crises: the October 1987 crash, the 1997 East Asian crisis, and the
consequences of the Russian debt default in 1998. Monetary policy reacted to
two wars: the 1990–1991 Gulf War and the 2001 War on Terrorism. The Fed
became more transparent by regularly announcing its current federal funds
rate target beginning in February 1994. Most importantly, monetary policy
adapted to an environment in which the Fed acquired near full credibility for
16 The 1980 recession was associated with the brief imposition of credit controls. See Schreft
(1990).16 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
low inﬂation, and the Fed navigated a difﬁcult transition toward higher trend
productivity growth. Because the problems were so varied, it is difﬁcult to
draw overall lessons from the period, but one thing is clear. Similar chal-
lenges are likely to be encountered in the future and the experience gained in
surmounting them should help the Fed improve monetary policy.
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